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AREA-DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES: A NEW FORM OF
GOVERNMENT BY PROCLAMATION
ROSS D. NETHERTON*

Let it be understood in the very beginning that the views of this
writer regarding Public Authorities are partisan. He believes that
recent years have witnessed the emergence of a new instrumentality
of local government, the species of which are sometimes called "port
authorities," sometimes "toll commissions," sometimes "regional
boards," but all of which are capable of being described generically
as "area-development authorities." He submits that these instrumentalities, while offering a unique and efficient means of performing many
of the special functions which local governments in our times are
called upon to undertake, have been allowed to grow away from the
sound principles which must be adhered to if the form of government
which our country has is to remain healthy.
The writer is a partisan in that he would judge the propriety of these
instrumentalities according to certain principles which should not be
compromised. Specifically, he believes that power to affect vitally the
public welfare inevitably carries with it the responsibility to consider
the public welfare in commensurate degree. Where special functions
are undertaken, government should move cautiously. Particularly in
encouraging expansion of industrial or commercial development of a
local area, governments should not hastily move in to do what private
enterprise is unwilling to do for itself, or to circumvent the existing
structure of government by the creation of ad hoc units. And finally,
in the matter of allocating the financial burdens of providing for services and facilities of a special character, he believes that direct beneficiaries should, insofar as possible, carry the burden of paying for
them. These principles are, of course, as old as the history of our
struggle to solve the problems of urbanization, and, in recent years, the
influence of the federal government, through federal-aid and various
other programs, upon the establishment of local special function
agencies has been very great.' Yet it is submitted that these principles

I * Lecturer, Washington College of Law of The American University; Legi.slative Counsel, American Automobile Association, Washington, D.C.
1. Regarding the present numbers of "special function units," Dean Fordham
has pointed out that statistics are difficult to evaluate because of the concealment of many agencies within the formal organization of the'parent government, and the complexity of classification of such units. Yet, he writes "there,
is ample basis for the observation that the ad hoc unit is still enjoying its heyday" despite genuine effort to reduce the numbers of these units and simplify
the structure of government. FORDfHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 25 (1949)..See
also Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47

YALE L.J. 14, 15-17 (1937).

One notes with ifiterest that certain non-political agencies of the Federal
Government maintain a cautious attitude on this. question even, under the
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are basic and require that we be partisan to them even when attacking problems of such magnitude as the future of our cities hold. As
we have lived by them for past generations, so we now must find a way
to utilize the great, constructive capabilities of these new instrumentalities of government within the limits of such principles.
I. The Evolving Form of Public Authorities in Our Times
The history of special function units of local 'government devoted to
expansion of industrial and commercial development of metropolitan
areas may be dated from the creation of the Port of New York Authority in 1921. At ' this time the essential elements of a new idea in
local government were combined and found expression in the interstate compact between New York and New Jersey.2 Postponing for
the moment a detailed description of the anatomy of the Port Authority, suffice it to say that by their action the States of New York
and New Jersey created a "corporate municipal instrumentality," administered by a 12-man commission which was entrusted with management of Authority affairs, empowered to borrow money outside the
constitutional limitations applicable to state and municipal debts, and
rendered self-supporting through the power to collect charges for
services furnished to the public. Its avowed purpose was to "deal
with the planning and development of terminal and transportation
facilities and to improve the commerce of the port district." The oftenrecounted background of the interstate compact included many years
of unsuccessful struggle to achieve cooperative development of the
New York and New Jersey waterfront area by private enterprise and
local governmental action. 3 In these early years the crying need was
to solve the problems of railroad transportation and maritime terminal
facilities for the New York-New Jersey waterfronts. However, within
the first decade of its life there was delivered into the hands of the
Port Authority the means of creating far greater power than its beginduress of urgent need for extraordinary action. On March 28, 1955, Comptroller

General Campbell testified before the Roads Subcommittee of the Senate
Public Works Committee in hearings on S. 1160 (84th Cong., 1st Sess.), providing for creation of a Federal Highway Corporation for financing construction of the National System of Interstate Highways. He stated therein: "We
are opposed to the creation of new Government corporations, unless for the
most compelling reasons of overriding public necessity. The corporate form
of government is objectionable because, for the most part, it is free from
the normal safeguards set up by Congress to maintain adequate control over
the conduct of public business and the expenditure of public funds."
2. New York Sess. Laws 1921, c. 203; New Jersey Sess. Laws 1921, c. 152.
Congressional consent to this compact given in 67th Cong., 1st Sess., Public
Res. 17, S.J. Res. 88, 42 STAT. 174 (1921).
3. For a description of the pre-history of the Port of New York Authority,
see BARD, THE PORT OF NEW YORK ATJTHORITY cc. 1, 2 (1942). See also
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1922); and NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
PORT & HARBOR DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, JOINT REPORT, WITH CoMPREHENsIVE
PLAN *AND RECOMMENDATIONS 41-42 (1920).
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nings had foretold. As the age of motor vehicle travel came, it was
perceived that the operation of vehicular river crossings could become
a- principal and highly successful activity of the Port Authority. For
this purpose, the Port Authority in 1926 sold its first issue of bonds
in the amount of $14,000,000 secured by liens on the net revenues of
two toll bridges connecting Staten Island with New Jersey. Its second
bond issue, sold only months later, was for $20,000,000 to commence
construction of the George Washington Bridge and was similarly
secured. These issues were followed in 1928 by an issue of $12,000,000
for another bridge between Staten Island and Bayonne, New Jersey,
and an added issue of $30,000,000 in 1929 to complete construction of
the George Washington Bridge. Meanwhile, the Holland Tunnel had
been completed by state commissions, and in 1931 was sold to the
Port Authority in a transaction financed by a $50,000,000 bond issue.
Simultaneously, $16,000,000 worth of Port Authority bonds were sold to
finance construction of the Inland Terminal No. 1 (known as the Port
Authority Commerce Building), designed to facilitate the handling
of freight in the metropolitan district. Altogether, within a space of
5 years, the Port Authority had successfully marketed a grand total
of $142,000,000 in bonds secured solely by the toll revenues of its
bridges, tunnels and terminal building property!
, In retrospect, however, the significant point to be seen in this decade
of activity is not the unprecedented magnitude of the borrowing of Port
Authority, but the combination of powers that it concentrated in itself. Its original endowment had rendered it almost entirely autonomous as far as administration of its own affairs was concerned, and
its geographical boundaries had given it control over the waterfront
of the world's greatest port. To these sources of strength it now added
a new type of revenue bond project - the toll bridge and toll tunnelfrom which it foresaw the accrual of revenues sufficient to carry out
every phase of comprehensive port-area development and promotion
that was to be conceived. The final legal step in creating this power
came when the New York and New Jersey legislatures, by concurrent
resolutions, unified control of all vehicular river crossings in the Port
Authority and provided for the pooling of surplus revenues from all its4
facilities for the support of all bond obligations of the Port Authority.
In justification of this step, the concurring States declared that:
"the vehicular traffic moving across the interstate waters within the
Port of New York constitutes a general movement of traffic which
follows the most accessible and practicable routes, and that the users
of each bridge or tunnel over or under the said waters benefit by the
existence of every other bridge or tunnel since all such bridges and
tunnels as a group facilitate the movement of such traffic and relieve
congestion at each of the several bridges and tunnels." 5
4. New Jersey Sess. Laws 1931, cc. 4, 5; New York Sess. Laws, 1931, cc. 47, 48.
5. Ibid.
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Accordingly, the states agreed that "the construction, maintenance,
operation and control of all such bridges and tunnels heretofore or
hereafter authorized by the two States shall be unified under the Port
of New York Authority, to the end that the tolls and other revenues
therefrom shall be applied so far as practicable to the ... said bridges
and tunnels as a group ... it being the policy of the two States that
such bridges and tunnels shall as a group be in all respects self6
sustaining."
With its financial machinery thus consolidated; the Port Authority
had only to wait for its power to grow. For a picture of this growth,
a glance at the most recent decade is revealing. 7 At the end of 1954 a
list of the facilities of the Port Authority was as follows:
Holland Tunnel
Lincoln Tunnel
George Washington Bridge
Bayonne Bridge
Goethals Bridge
Outerbridge Crossing
Port Authority Building
Port Authority Bus Terminal
New York Truck Terminal
Newark Truck Terminal

Central Maintenance Shops
Port Newark
Hoboken-Port Authority Piers
Grain Terminal, Columbia St. Pier
La Guardia Airport
Newark Airport
New York International Airport
Teterboro Airport
Heliports

The total investment in these facilities at the end of 1954 was
$519,198,351 - slightly more than double the amount shown on the Port
Authority's financial statement 10 years earlier. Along with this, the
amounts necessary for debt service had risen from $7 million in 1945
to $29.1 million in 1954 and the ratio of operating expenses to gross
revenue had risen from roughly one-third to one-half. But, in the
overall view, there was no sign that the holders of the Port Authority's
$246 million funded debt had cause for concern about their debtor's
financial condition.
It would thus appear that those who have said that the Port of New
York Authority inaugurated a new era of toll bridges in this country,
fell short of the truth, for in reality the Port Authority marks the
beginning of wide scale area development financed by toll bridge
8
surpluses.
Following the example of the Port of New York Authority, other
metropolitan areas were quick to consider the possibility of employing
6. Ibid.
7. PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT, 1954, 68-69. Legislation
to permit the Port of New York to establish parking lot facilities was passed
by New York (S. Int. No. 2335) and New Jersey (S. No. 147).

8. See FOWLER, REVENUE BONDS 24-27 (1938), and compare- with BIRD, A
STUDY OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY 65 (1942) who points out that "in

the past the bulk of the Port Authority's operating revenues have been derived
from tolls charged for the six vehicular water crossings." In 1946, tolls made
up 91.8% of operating revenues; in 1947, 88.6%.
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s'.AJUp riyices to expand developmental and promotional activities.
Pennsylvania's first Authority Act came in 1933. 9 In 1951, Pennsylvanai acomacted with New Jersey to create the Delaware River Port
A.thprity, of which more will be said hereinafter. 10 In 1949, Missouri
and.Illinois created the Bi-State Development Authority in the metropolitan area of St. Louis." Recent federal legislation relating to the
development of the St. Lawrence Seaway aroused keen interest in
potential deepsea ports such as Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland and Toledo
and turned them to planning for port development and promotion
through the mechanism of Authorities. 12
In 1953 two new compacts affecting interstate border areas were consummated. Pennsylvania and New Jersey enlarged the powers of the
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission for the purpose of
encouraging development of the entire Delaware River Valley north of
Philadelphia. 13 In addition to its original jurisdiction over bridges,
the new commission embraced port and terminal facilities with th~e
power to combine for financial purposes any port and terminal facilities
with bridges and collect tolls for the use of the facilities. The second
and perhaps most striking compact of recent years was the Waterfront
Commission Compact between New York and New Jersey. 14 Arising
out of unsuccessful efforts to improve waterfront labor practices and
suppress crime, the Waterfront Commission was vested with power to
_icense stevedores and longshoremen and police the conditions of emV1oympent in the port area. Its activities are entirely regulatory and
b ,ye significance because they represent the first use of "municipal
corporate instrumentalities" for regulatory activities outside the field
of conservation. Wifth boundaries identical with those of the Port of
".9!'1At of December 27, 1933, Pennsylvania, Pamphlet Laws 114. For .a review of the development of the use of Authorities in Pennsylvania, see address

of George P. Appel, at meeting of Municipal Law Section, American Bar Association, August 17, 1954.
_ 10. Laws, Pennsylvania, 1951, Act No. 274; New Jersey Sess. Laws 1951, c.
287. Congressional consent given in Pub. L. No. 573, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (July
1-7; 1952).
_. 1.,aws, Illinois, 1949, pp. 448, 449; Laws, Missouri, 1949, p. 558.
12. Vicker, Seaway'Fever: Great Lakes Cities Break Out With Rash Of New
H'arbor Projects,Wall Street Journal, March 8, 1955, p. 1; Toledo City Journal,
March 19, 1955, pp. 1-2; N. Y. Times, June 26, 1955, report of plans for Boston
authority. Legislation to create a Niagara Frontier Port Authority was passed
by'th e New York State legislature in April 1955 (Senate Int. 2975).
, 13. The original agency was created in 1934 to administer state owned
b'fidges across the Delaware River. Pa. Pamp. L. 1352 (1931); N. J. Sess. Laws
1934, c. 215; consented to by Congress in Pub. L. No. 411, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,
49 STAT. 1058 (1935). In 1953, concurrent supplementary legislation by the two
states transformed it into an area-development authority, Pa. Pamp. L. 369
(1953);".N. J. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 297. Congressional consent was unsuccessfully sought in the 82d Congress, 2d Session (H.R. 9820, S. 3718) and is pend-

ing.:in..the 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (S. 889).

See in this connection remarks in

oppopitiQ4 by Rep. Alfred Sieminski, 100 CONG. REc. A-5053 (July 13, 1954).
_14. New York Sess. Laws 1953, cc 882, ,883; New Jersey Sess. Laws 1953, cc.
202, 203; .consented to by Congress in Pub. L., No. 252,, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., 67
STAT. 540 (1953).....
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New York Authority, the Waterfront Commission would seem to reprl&.
sent a further fragmentation of the governmental powers of the miamicipalities in the area concerned, and would seem to suggest a quer
as to what further steps may be necessary in the future if difficiulties
arise in the matter of coordinating administration and policy-aihiong
5
7. •.
"
several such "bodies corporate and politic."'
Thus the evolution of the Public Authority as an instrumeit:bf
government is not yet complete; perhaps it is even too early to predift
with confidence what its ultimate form will be. Yet the examile "of
the past thirty years attest the hasty pace with which we' are experimenting with Public Authorities as replacements for organized -political subdivisions of the states in the performance of many function's.
The conception of an autonomous appointed commission, free to fumhtion as private enterprises do, and endowed with a profitable monopbly
of power over vital public services or segments of the economy; was-thi
first bold step in this evolutionary process. The next step, equally as
bold as it was vital to the success of the Public Authority eoncept,
was in utilizing an already familiar financial tool - the revenue boidon a mass scale to attract private capital into Authority projects; 16
Next, came the device of pooling revenues and combining: projects,
freeing the Authority from the necessity of segregating its revenues
and permitting the surpluses from profitable operations to be'diverted
into the marginal or deficit projects. And finally, has come the assignment of regulatory powers, presently constituted in separate, autonomous commissions, but significantly with conterminous geogiaphical jurisdiction with other non-regulatory Authorities. That this is a
process involving fragmentation of established municipal powers has
been remarked before.'7 But it is also constructive in its way, %for,by
adding powers unknown to conventional municipal corporations, such
Public Authorities now appear capable of growth far beyond their
initial expectations.
II. The Anatomy of Area-Development Authorities
While it must be confessed that the ultimate evolutionary development of what are called "Area-Development Authorities" cannotbe
described at the present time, it is possible to see what some of their
vital organs are and how they are constructed. With apologies to the
15. See Zimmerman, F. L. and Wendell, M., in THE BOOK OF THE STATES,
1954-1955, 16-17.
16. Actually the revenue bond was utilized to make possible the expansion
of inland waterways in the 1850's, and, as Dean Fordham has pointed out, the

"present revenue bond era" began in the 1890's. Fordham, Revenue Bond
Sanctions, 42 COL. L. REv. 395, 400-405 (1942). See also FOWLER, op. cit. supra

note 8, passim.

17. Virtue, The Public Use of Private Capital: A Discussion Relating to
Municipal Bond Financing,35 VA. L. REV. 285, 294-5 (1949).
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medical profession for possible loose use of its technical terms in the
analogy, one may suggest that the Authority's "brain" is its board of
commissioners.
Mention has already been made of the appointed commissioners comprising the "corporate municipal instrumentality." Uniformly such
commissioners are appointed by the governors of the parent states.
Individual terms of office overlap and there is a tendency to reappoint
the same commissioners.1 8 Once appointed, the commissioners' responsibility to the parent states becomes a mixture of formality and prac-

tical business tactics. The Compact of the Port of New York Authority,
for example, provides that "each State provide by law for the exercise
of a veto power by the Governors thereof over any action of the Commission."1 9 Both states enacted such laws in 1927, but their effect and
scope has never been sketched in by judicial interpretation. The single
instance in which a veto was interposed was subsequently rescinded
after adjustment of the difficulties which prompted it.20 Further, the
common practice of the Port Authority to obtain informal understandings through consultation prior to taking action makes it unlikely that the courts will develop any extensive doctrine on this question. Against this background the other provisions for responsibility
to the state governors (i.e., provision for "immediate" transmittal of
certified copies of the minutes of the commission's meetings, removal
of commissioners for cause after hearing, and power of reappointment)
become more formal than actual as checks and balances on the Port
Authority. In the case of the Delaware River Port Authority, the
compact provides for reports to the governors and specifically calls for
returning to the states for approval of new projects not already within
the Port Authority's power by the terms of its organic legislation and
approval of plans for certain projects specifically mentioned in that
legislation.2 ' The Bi-State Development Authority is prohibited from
taking any action which will affect the finances of any governmental
subdivision, but contains no special procedure for guaranteeing this
precaution in the actual administration of its operations.22
Basically, of course, there remains in the parent states power to
modify the undertakings of their original compacts through subsequent
concurrent legislation. However, subsequent restrictive legislation
cannot easily be reconciled with the mutual covenants of the states
with each other and their bondholders not to do anything "to diminish
or impair the power of the Commission" so as to affect the security of
the outstanding obligations. To date no such attempt at dimunition of
18. See BIRD, A STUDY OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AuTHORiTy 34 (1949).
19. Port of New York Authority Compact, Art. XVI.
20. BIRD, op. cit. supra,note 18, at 38.
21. Delaware River Port Authority Compact, Art. XI, XIL
22. See Kinsey, "The Bi-State Development Agency," in TnE BOOK OF TIM

STATEs, 1954-1955, pp. 34-35.
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Authority powers has been attempted following the commencement of
operations by an Authority.2
Similarly, Congress may also, in theory, withdraw its consent to an
interstate compact. Yet practical considerations deny the likelihood
that Congress will maintain any continuing scrutiny of Authorities
created by interstate compact or be moved to rescind its consent once
24
given.
With such devices as these constituting the chief limitations on the
power of decision residing in the governing group of an Authority,
the full significance of the great degree of autonomy enjoyed by these
bodies begins to be realized. Practically, however, the real control of
affairs is still further removed from any responsibility to the public.
The real balance of power in the affairs of the Area-Development
Authorities - as with any other public authority which is predominantly dependent upon private capital-lies with the investment
bankers. Consider here the plan of the Delaware River Port Authority
to operate a rapid-transit system serving population within a 35-mile
radius from the Camden-Philadelphia area: Prior experience showed
that such a system would be too much of a marginal operation to attract private enterprise. However, if integrated with other profitable
Port Authority projects, the system could be operated. In this setting
a policy decision must be made. How such decisions are reached is
suggested in the report of the Port Authority.
"Whatever the various elements of the solution may be, there will,
come a time when the engineers finally can say to themselves: 'Well,
that's it. It is economically desirable, (which means that the area
needs a system for its economic health and future expansion), it is
technically sound, (which means that there are no insoluble construction or operating problems), and it makes sense. Now let's take it to
the bankers and see what they make of it.'
To put it more bluntly, the engineers must obtain the answer from
qualified banking sources as to whether the plan is one on which those
sources will lend money at reasonable rates of interest. The only way
a Port Authority or any similar agency could finance such a system
would be through borrowing, securing the loan with revenue bonds
whose interest and debt service would be paid in accordance with very
rigid conditions.
It is possible, of course, that the bankers themselves might have recommendations which would require the engineers to restudy the plan.
23. However, prior to obtaining Congressional consent to the compact efforts
are sometimes made to modify the terms of the agreement. See, for example,
legislation pending in Pennsylvania (S. 173) and New Jersey (S. 83) during
1955 legislative sessions.
24. See, for example, the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 375,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., in Hearings before House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee No. 5 (May 14, 1952).
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Construction stages might be altered to effect a more favorable financing picture, or other changes suggested. In this interplay of engineer
ing and ftnancial adjustment, the Port Authority will not participate.

(Italics supplied) 25

Here, perhaps more than at any other point of comparison, is seen
the great difference between the processes of those who are directly
responsible to the public and those who are not.
Turn now from the "brain" of the Area-Development Authority, to
a description of its "heart."
The heart of the Area-Development Authority is the revenue bond,
by means of which the life-blood is induced to flow into the Authority's
projects. By the standards of the specialists who annually examine
these hearts, they are strong. Following the lead of the Port of New
York Authority, others have sought to secure exclusive power to
operate toll bridges and tunnels, the revenues from which may be
used as security for payment of bonds. By grouping the toll crossings
with other projects for financing purposes, the profitable ventures
carry the unprofitable ones. In this way, the George Washington
Bridge, although its own construction cost has been paid for twice by
tolls collected since it was opened, continues to support the other port
development and port promotional activities; and the Holland Tunnel,
now having paid for itself four times, serves the same purpose.26 At
one time, spokesmen for the Port of New York Authority referred to
its toll bridge operation as "self-liquidating" - implying that the policy
of charging tolls was merely for the purpose of retiring the bonded
debt incurred for construction. 27 More recently, however, this phrase
has been replaced by the term "self-supporting," with no attempt to
conceal the financial assistance obtained from toll bridge and tunnel
revenues for non-paying projects.2 8 Perpetuation of tolls poses no
legal problem since, under the practice of grouping projects, the
Authority may renew its power to continue collecting tolls merely by
25. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, THE SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY MASS
TRANSPORTATION SURVEY AND REPORT 21-22 (Sept. 1954).
26. See PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORTS.
On the other hand, Port Newark and Newark Airport were heavily in debt
when taken over by the Port of New York Authority so that the Port Authority
in 1947 had to commit itself to invest $23 million in the following five years
as part of the transaction acquiring the property. See statement of Austin J.
Tobin, Executive Director for the Port of New York Authority before Joint
Legislative Committee of the Senate and House of the State of New Jersey,
February 26, 1952, pp. 38-40.
For discussion of factors affecting the toll levels see PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY, REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NEW JERSEY JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMmIITTEE APPOINTED PURSUANT TO SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED
MARCH 11, 1940 (June 1940).

27. Cohen, J. H., "The Port of New York Authority, The Evolution of the
Authority Plan in American Administrative Law," a lecture delivered at New
York University School of Law, March 13, 1940, pp. 29-30.
28. BIRD, op. cit. supra,note 11 at 68.
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commencing construction of a new project which requires revenue
bond capital. Tolls may then continue until the last bonds of the last
29
projects are retired.
The mechanism of revenue-bond financing is further strengthened by
the bond covenants. Consider the example of the Delaware River Authority: Mention has already been made of the states' covenant not to
impair the powers of the Authority during the life of any of the bonds.
Additionally, the states also covenanted not to permit any other persons or bodies to construct or operate any other vehicular bridge or
tunnel within 10 miles in either direction from the Authority's Camden-Philadelphia bridge. And the Port Authority covenanted with
the bondholders "at all times to maintain and collect such tolls, rentals
and other charges ... as shall be required" to service and retire the
bonds secured thereby. 30 Such covenants, which now must be regarded
as customary for the protection of toll crossing revenue bonds, carry
31
with them the further protection of bondholders' judicial remedies,
the whole of which, viewed altogether, constitute an almost impregnable barrier to outside opposition once the Authority's financial plan
has been set in operation.
Continuing to describe the anatomy of Area-Development Authorities, one turns finally to the various types of projects and services that
are undertaken. In terms of the analogy which has been begun, these
may be called the "hands and feet." By reference to these, the terms
"port development" and "port promotion" obtain a clearer meaning.
A list of the facilities already operated by the Port of New York
Authority has already been made; so also have been mentioned the
Delaware River Port Authority's toll bridges and rapid transit system.
29. At this point one recalls the question of Rep. Fallon addressed to Daniel
Goldberg, Asst. General Counsel, Port of New York Authority, appearing in
support of the Delaware River Port Authority Compact. The subject was
diversion of revenue surpluses into marginal projects of the Authority:
"Rep. Fallon: . . . In

the beginning these projects will probably not be

financed on their own basis of revenue income at the time, so that each new
project will be financed from the one that is already in operation, and you will
have a balance of revenue over your costs of operation.
Mr. Goldberg: The hope is that you will not have to use the old facilities'
revenue to support the new one; but the necessity of pledging the revenue
of the existing facility does exist if you are going to have any hope of getting
the new one.
Rep. Fallon: Can you not see in the future when you build up reserves from
existing facilities that you are going to look around for other public improvements that you might be able to make and use this revenue on?
Mr. Goldberg:If there is a public demand and necessity for the new facility

I am not shocked by the suggestion.
Rep. Fallon:I often see where there is a demand, but sometimes if the money
is not there the demand subsides. The temptation will always be there."
(82d Cong., 2d Sess., House Hearings on Delaware River Port Authority
Compact, H.R. 8315, 8316, pp. 65-66.)
30. DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY, GENERAL BOND RESOLUTION, MAY 8, 1953

AND FIRST SERIES SUPPLEMENTAL RESOLUTION, MAY 20, 1953, p. 55.

31. For discussion of these remedies see Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions,
supra, note 16 and FOWLER, Op. cit. supra,note 8.
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However, these lists indicate only the first steps taken toward the
eventual goal of comprehensive area development. Consider, for example, the projects and facilities which the Delaware River Port Authority may acquire, construct, operate and maintain in the effectuation
32
of its port development purpose:
Railroads
Railways, tracks, tunnels, subways, elevated structures, poles, wires,
conduits, powerhouses, substations, transmission lines, car barns, shops,
yards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations, cars and motive equipment.
Terminals
Marine, railroad, motor truck, air, coal, grain, lumber and other terminals for transportation of passengers and freight.
TransportationFacilities
Railroads, rapid transit lines, motor trucks, tunnels, bridges, airports,
boats, ferries, carfloats, lighters, tugs, floating elevators, barges, scows,
harbor craft of all kinds, aircraft: equipment, material and supplies
therefor.
Terminal Facilities
Wharves, piers, ships, ferries, docks, dry docks, ship repair yards, bulkheads, dock walls, basins warehouses, cold storage, overhead appliances, coal bunkers, oil and water stations, dredging equipment,
markets, radio stations.
This list does not, of course, indicate the business promotional activities in which the Authority may engage. At present these involve
maintenance of offices in the various cities in the United States and
foreign countries, and promotion of business through various publicity
activities.
In brief, then, these are the three vital parts of the anatomy of
Area-Development Authorities-a broad range of activities covering
many phases of area development and business promotion, a profitable
monopoly of vital transportation facilities capable of attracting sufficient private capital through revenue bonds, and a small group of key
men operating within a corporate form or organization according to the
methods and morals of the business world.
III. The Philosophy of Area-Development Authorities
Mention of manners and morals leads to consideration of the philosophy which has been adopted by Area-Development Authorities
regarding their responsibilities in providing public services and operating public facilities. Having broad powers of discretion and an assured
monopoly of vital public facilities, what do the Authorities conceive
32. Delaware River Port Authority Compact, Art. I, XIII.
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to be their public responsibilities in exercising their power? In large
measure, this becomes a question of whose dollars should be spent for
whose benefit? At the heart of the matter is the principle that where
special services or facilities are provided they should be paid for by
the beneficiaries thereof.
The Congressional hearings relating to the Delaware River Port
Authority compact provided a forum for the opposing views on this
issue. The case for the Port Authority was stated thus:
"Let us put this in capsule form - the States wish to set up an authority to undertake various improvements in the port district, to make
charges for the use of these improvements and with the proceeds to
undertake additional projects. The authority will be self-supporting,
borrowing money entirely on its own credit and the revenues of the
enterprises it undertakes. The primary source of revenue must be the
tolls from the present crossing. There is no legal limitation on the
length of toll collection on the present bridge and we are asking that if
a new bridge is built, similar freedom shall be accorded.... An exshould be granted for
emption from the General Bridge Act [of 1946]
33
bridges in metropolitan areas such as ours."
If Congress had accepted this proposal without qualification the Authority would have been permitted to depart from the requirements of
the General Bridge Act of 1946 in the following respects: (1) It
would have been able to combine any or all of its revenue-producing
projects into one unit for financing, with the necessary result of perpetuating the collection of tolls on its bridges indefinitely beyond the
time when those were paid for in order to build up sinking funds to
amortize the debts incurred on any other of the Authority projects.
(2) It would have been able to fix bridge toll rates at levels sufficient
to provide a fair return on the combined costs of all facilities,instead of
merely the costs of the bridges producing such tolls. (3) It would
have been free to use its surplus for use in projects from which the toll
payers received no benefit.
The case against the philosophy espoused by the Authority was
expressed by the Bureau of Public Roads:
"The propriety of combining for financing purposes highway bridges
and tunnels with non-highway facilities of various types not directly
related to such highway-crossing facilities ... and thus make it possible to subject the highway bridges to perpetual tolls to support such
non-highway facilities is open to serious question. Highway bridges
33. Hearingsbefore Senate Public Works Committee on S. 2187, 2188 (Delaware River Port Authority, Supplemental Compact) 36, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952). For an earlier expression of this philosoph~j as it attempted to justify
the policy of "grouping," see statement of John E. Ramsey, Chief Executive
Officer of Port of New York Authority, before Joint Conference Committee
of New York and New Jersey Special Committees on Interstate Transportation Facilities, March 6, 1930, p. 1-2.
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and tunnels, like the public highways of which they form a part, are
designed primarily for free use for business, pleasure and all other
daily activities of life by all members of the general public with their
privately owned vehicles, for which privilege they pay license fees
on the vehicles used and taxes on the gasoline consumed, the revenues
derived from such sources usually being applied to public highway
construction and maintenance.... Highway bridges and tunnels, therefore, might justifiably be combined with each other for financing
purposes under the circumstances here involved and be subject to tolls
until the cost of the facilities so combined has been amortized, but they
should not be combined with or required to assist in financing other
facilities of an entirely different character .... The various and sundry
non-highway port-development facilities . . .are to be distinguished
from highway bridges and tunnels in that they would be used
primarily by private commercial concerns in the conduct of their business enterprises and should be self-supporting as such or combined
with other facilities of like nature, but should not be combined for
34
financing purposes with highway bridges and tunnels."
Opposing this established federal policy, witnesses for the Authority
contended that:
"pooling of revenues and continuance of tolls is essential for the sound
development and financing of any plan for supplying the needed facilities even though, in the final event, the new facilities will quite possibly support themselves, and little, if any, of the bridge revenues
35
actually will be expended on them."
And, they argued that:
"it is entirely equitable to take from a willing user of a toll bridge the
money necessary to improve the great port area served by the bridge
which, in the overwhelming majority of cases, is contributing directly
or indirectly to the prosperity of the individual who pays the tolls." 36
The issue drawn here is basic, for it involves the relationship of those
who wield power to those who are subject to that power. The "equity"
of taking from a willing user of a toll bridge has a certain and defined
limit for governmental officials who are directly responsible to the
public for their decisions. Suffice to say that those who control the
policy decisions of Area-Development Authorities have an entirely
different concept of this equity. And, one may suggest, this difference is due in large measure to the lack of necessity for them to
account to the public for their decisions and the lack of practical
means of bringing them to account through conventional methods of
legal process for this purpose.
34. Report of House Public Works Committee to accompany HR 8315 (Delaware River Port Authority, Supplemental Compact) 10, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952).
35. Hearings before Senate Public Works Committee, supra. note 32, at 113.
36. Hearings before House Public Works Committee, supra. note 29 at 26.
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IV. The Problemto be Solved

From what has been said, it would seem that the problem to be
solved is one of restoring to Area-Development Authorities the moral
philosophy which prevails in other species of local government in our
country- to instill, if you will, political morality in activities which
are essentially political in character although cast in the form of business transactions.
At the outset it is difficult to perceive how this can come about since
the machinery of democratic responsibility is almost entirely lacking.
The parent states have bound themselves not to exercise the means of
regulation in the public interest which are generally applicable to public agencies. The taxpayer-voter is completely out of the play. Not
only are his civic functions paralyzed when he is cast in the role of
the consumer of services rendered by the Authority and financed
through revenue bonds, but even when he has a chance to vote or sue,
he lacks coherent information on the basis of which to make up his
mind.3 7 The Authority is dependent upon the continued willingness of
the investment bankers to market its securities and makes no pretense
about the predominance of this factor in its policy considerations. The
interest of the public in the most efficient use of bonds and the way in
which services are administered is not the responsibility of the creditor
to consider or promote. 38
It is sometimes said that the public must be satisfied with the
methods and policies of Public Authorities because one hears so few
complaints. Yet under the circumstances, lacking information and
practical remedies, this argument becomes as hollow as the equally
frequent assertion that the activities of the Authority are a blessing
because "they cost the taxpayer nothing."
The implications of this issue were noted in 1938 on the occasion of
a re-examination of local government by the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, and summarized as follows in its
report:
"It is well to consider the underlying possibilities of authorities and
their place in the future governmental scheme. They bring sharply
to the fore two types of problems....
37. Consider the problem of "finding out where the money goes" in the light
of testimony by counsel for the Port of New York Authority in House Hearings
on the Delaware River Port Authority, supra. note 29 at 63-64.
"The pooled revenues constitute the base for the pledging of the bonds group
projects. Then you start getting into refunding operations and lose all track
of what goes where for a while. I do not think the George Washington Bridge
amortized its cost yet, but I think it would be very difficult to establish that
exactly from the records .... We have facilities that are financed out of surpluses of bridges and tunnels and other facilities which are in the black ....
The ones which are being at present supported by the group which is producing surplus revenues would include-.our airports, our bus terminals, and
our truck terminals, I think those are all."
38. Virtue, supra note 17 at 301-02.
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The first problem deals with popular responsibility. Heretofore there
has been an invariable and close tie between local government and the
voter. But the lines of popular control which lead to the authority are
said by some to be so indirect as to be almost non-existent. The directors of an authority are usually appointed by a popularly elected
executive, as are most other administrative officials. But unlike ordinary administrative officials, for whose actions the appointing officer
is personally responsible, the authority attains, by its very creation, a
separate and powerful personality whose acts, insofar, at least, as they
relate to the creation of debt, are irrevocable. By its unique power to
create debt, too, the activities of a single authority may sometimes
transcend in financial scope the activities of a whole village or city.
But the legislative body of a city or village is popularly elected, while
the directorate of an authority is not. The question which must be
decided is whether or not the authority is dangerous, and if dangerous,
whether it is to be prohibited or continued perhaps with certain
restrictions." 39
V. The Solution to the Problem
It is, of course, presumptuous to suggest that there is short answer
to the problem of adjusting the methods of Area-Development Authorities to the principles by which local governments must live. The
best that one may hope for is to suggest a set of controls that will
permit change to take place with the full benefit of careful consideration of what is best for all concerned.
Thus, it is no answer to say that Area-Development Authorities
should not be permitted. The metropolitanization of certain regions
demands that under many circumstances legislatures should provide
the necessary statutory sanction of such authorities. However, part of
the responsibility for protecting the public in these situations rests
with the legislature in its initial decision as to whether localities should
be allowed to resort to extraordinary devices or should be compelled
to work out their problems within the conventional political subdivisions of the state. Serious consideration must be given to differentiating between the truly self-supporting services, which public
authorities may properly administer, and those services which are
not self-supporting. 40 In the case of the latter, a second question must
be asked: should they be undertaken at all by public subsidy and
administration? The answer to this question should be searchingly
explored, for though the government acts in the clothing of a corporate
entity and charges which it collects are called "tolls" instead of "taxes,"
the facts of the matter are not changed. The facts are that when
a public corporation is endowed with a profitable monopoly of vital
39. 11 NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE, REPORTS,
Local Government and Home Rule" 244 (1938).
40. See comments in Nehemkis, supra. note 1 at 33; Cohen, supra. note 27
at 29-30.
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transportation services which conventional government would otherwise provide, such corporate entity is acting in the capacity of a
government. Admittedly many projects having great popularity and
benefit to the industrial and commercial interests of a community cannot justify themselves under close scrutiny based on the premises
which state and municipal legislatures must adopt. Yet, who can be
the loser by adopting such a policy of caution in the creation of public
authorities?
A second area in which constructive regulation should be sought
deals with the provision of standards by which to measure the
propriety of actions by public authorities and remedies for the public.
At the present time, the most striking examples of the growth of AreaDevelopment Authorities are in areas where vital toll bridge and tunnel facilities are available to provide sources of revenue for the Authority's projects. Most of these have been created through interstate
compacts, to which Congress has given its consent. Almost invariably
they involve navigable waters. These considerations suggest that
federal legislation might appropriately undertake the task of outlining the policy Which will apply to the activities of Area-Development Authorities and provide remedies and procedures suitable to
implement such policy. Admittedly the wide range of area development and business promotion activities which is involved makes it
difficult to conceive of general legislation by Congress regulating the
entire list of projects now undertaken by Authorities in fields- appropriate for federal regulation. But such wide scope would not be
necessary since at the present time the most urgent need for control
is in corinection with toll bridges and tunnels. These are the projects
whose surpluses carry those activities of the Authority which are not
self-supporting. Hence, regulation of bridge and tunnel tolls would
be sufficient to correct the evils that now exist.
Historically Congress has consistently shown great concern lest the
power to demand tolls become an unreasonable burden on the users of
toll bridges. Early examples of legislation authorizing construction
and operation of toll bridges show that regulatory power was variously
assigned to the federal courts, 41 the Secretary of War,4 and sometimes was retained by Congress itself.43 In order to simplify and standardize the handling of bridge bills, the General Bridge Act of 1906 was
enacted. As to tolls, this Act provided:
41. Act of July 20, 1868, 15 STAT. 2120, c. 179; Act of June 30, 1870, 16 STAT.
173, c. 176; Canada Southern RR Co. v. International Bridge Co., 8 Fed. 190

(D.N.Y. 1881).
42. H. REP. 182, 59th Cong., Ist Sess., 1 (1929).
43. Act of July 27, 1868, 15 STAT. 232, c. 261; Act of August 15, 1876, 19
205, c. 303.

STAT.
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"Sec. 4.... If tolls shall be charged for the transit over any bridge constructed under the provisions of this act, of engines, cars, streetcars,
wagons, carriages, vehicles, animals, foot passengers, or other passengers, such tolls shall be reasonable and just, and the Secretary of War
may, at any time, and from time to time, prescribe the reasonable rates
of toll for such transit over such bridge, and the rates so prescribed
shall be the legal rates and shall be,the rates demanded and received
for such transit."44
Although the standard of "reasonable and just" was not further explained in the Act of 1906, it is suggested that the phrase was selected
because of its recent use by the courts in cases dealing with toll road
and railroad rates. 45 During the forty years that followed, Congress
showed a continuing concern over the possibility that the proprietors
of publicly owned toll bridges might abuse their discretion. 46 In a
further effort to simplify legislative procedure for authorizing construction of bridges over navigable waters, the General Bridge Act
of 1946 was passed.47 At this time it was apparently felt that state
regulatory agencies were sufficiently well developed to oversee the
problem of protecting the public against unreasonable tolls on bridges
wholly within state boundaries, so no federal regulatory powers were
reserved. However, with respect to interstate bridges, the provisions
of Section 4 of the General Bridge Act of 1906 were repeated. 48
Clearly this regulatory machinery is unable adequately to deal with
the Area-Development Authorities of the present day. For one thing
it deals only with toll bridges and does not reach vehicular toll tunnels.
For another, it attempts to delegate the complex task of rate regulation to an agency completely unequipped to deal with and, one may
venture to guess, largely uninterested in the problem of toll rates.
But, proceeding from the historic policy of the Federal Government
in favor of free highways and bridges, one may offer the following suggestion for legislation which could provide appropriate regulation of the
toll rate problem so as to permit the creation of self-supporting bridge
and tunnel projects where necessary without the danger of abuse of
49
power by their proprietors.
44. Act of March 23, 1906, 34 STAT. 85, c. 1130.
45. Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 'U.S. 578,
597 (1896)'; and Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544-45 (1898).
46. Hearings before House Interstate Commerce Committee on S. 4787 (Delaware River Bridge) 66th Cong., 3d Sess., 13-16 (1921); Hearings before House
Interstate Commerce Committee on S.J. Res. 41, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932);
Act of August 21, 1935, 49 STAT. 670, c. 597, #1.
47. Act of August 2, 1946, 60 STAT. 847, c. 753, Title V, #502.

See 92 CoNG.

REc. 6370 (79th Cong., 2d Sess.).
48. Ibid., #503, It was also provided that tolls on publicly owned bridges
should be adjusted to pay for their costs within a thirty year period at the
end of which the bridges would become free, #506.
49. Although no specific recommendation was contained in his statement,
President Truman urged consideration of regulatory legislation at the time
when the Delaware River Port Authority was created. In a statement accompanying his approval of these bills, he said:
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Preceding the substantive provisions it would seem appropriate to
declare that it is the policy of Congress that: (1) the free flow of
vehicular traffic over an efficient interstate highway system is essential to the national defense and to the peacetime economy of the
nation; (2) the charging of unnecessary, unreasonable or discriminatory tolls for passage or transit over bridges or through tunnels crossing the navigable waters of the United States, where such bridges or
tunnels are used in interstate or foreign commerce, is detrimental to
the free flow of vehicular traffic and the efficiency of the highways; and
(3) it is the policy of Congress to promote, encourage, and develop the
public ownership of such highway bridges and tunnels: to fix the rates
of toll charged for the use thereof at the minimum reasonably necessary, under economical management, to provide for amortization of
cost as soon as possible, and to foster and promote the operation of
such bridges and tunnels free from tolls.
In its regulatory provisions, such legislation should be applied to
any bridge or tunnel crossing the navigable water of the United
States, if such bridge or tunnel is used for purposes of travel or
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce. And it should provide that tolls shall be just and reasonable, with authority delegated
to an administrative agency to determine and by order prescribe
what will be the just and reasonable toll. Suggestions have already
been made that the Interstate Commerce Commission is the most
logical of all present federal agencies to undertake this task because it
is best equipped to deal with rate-making problems.50 As to standards
for the guidance of the regulatory agency, the term "just and reasonable" must draw its meaning from that portion of the declaration of
policy dealing with transformation of toll bridges and tunnels into
free public facilities as soon as their construction costs are amortized.
The practice of grouping non-highway projects with bridges and tunnels should not be permitted, at least insofar as it would allow proprietors of bridges and tunnels to use the aggregate bonded debt of
the entire group of facilities as the rate base for promulgating their
schedule of bridge and tunnel tolls. However, the standard should be
flexible enough to allow administrative discretion to determine.
whether more than one bridge or tunnel are so closely related as to
"I have therefore given my approval to these -measures despite the grave
doubts which I entertain concerning one provision they include....
The use of toll charges to support other facilities could create substantial
barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce, if the local development
authorities operating interstate bridges and tunnels resorted to high toll
charges and thus compelled interstate travelers to subsidize other local
projects .... I therefore urge the Congress, at its earliest opportunity, to
examine the rights reserved to it by this legislation with a view to taking
action which will protect the interstate motorist from toll charges which are
higher than necessary to finance the bridges and tunnels he uses." (White

House Press Release, July 17, 1952).
50. See H.R. 1611, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced January 6, 1955.
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constitute a necessary group of highway facilities for purposes of
financing, and hence for purposes of determining the rate base of their
tolls.
In its procedural provisions, such legislation should authorize the
regulatory agency to conduct hearings upon complaint or upon its own
initiative. Determinations and orders as to toll rate schedules should
be made upon a record after opportunity for notice and hearing, and
the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act should apply.
Authorization to appoint examiners, to hold hearings, and subpoena
witnesses and records should be included. Judicial review of administrative orders should be provided for in the United States Court
of Appeals, with certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
VI. In Conclusion
Thirty years is a relatively short time within which to perfect an
instrument of government. Yet within this span of time the AreaDevelopment Authority has become recognized as a useful and promising unit of local government, capable of undertaking the challenging
problems of regional planning, performing many functions and servicies of a special nature, and attracting private capital in amounts heretofore unobtainable by- municipalities through conventional methods
of public finance. This has been possible because the constitution of
such public authorities has made them administratively autonomous
"bodies corporate and politic," and because they have been able to
resort to large scale revenue bond financing on the strength of a
profitable monopoly of vital public transportation facilities. Their
methods have been patterned after the ways of private business rather
than the traditions of government; their policy decisions have been
controlled by their profit and loss statement rather than the allocation
of public funds.
They have produced impressive results in the direction of increasing
the value of the properties they have built or bought. Yet they are
equally impressive in their insulation from responsibility to the public
who are the rate payers and consumers of their services. With no direct
voice in the making of policy decisions and no practical judicial or
legislative remedies, the public has become subject to a new form of
government by proclamation. In the philosophy of the Area-Development Authorities, the principle that special services should be paid
for by the direct beneficiaries thereof is abandoned, and the users of
vehicular bridges and tunnels pay for a wide range of non-highway
facilities of benefit to local commerce and industry according to the
decisions of the Authority.
The problem of restoring some degree of political responsibility to
the activities of Public Authorities must, therefore, be faced. Part of
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the responsibility for protecting the public lies with the legislatures of
the parent states and Congress. In defining the proper scope of the
Public Authority's activities, those projects which can be carried on
as self-liquidating governmental services should be distinguished
from those which cannot, and a legislature should not empower an
Authority to do what it would not undertake itself as a responsible
political unit of government. In moments of self-appraisal, spokesmen for Area-Development Authorities have recognized this fact
and warned against the dangers of failing to understand their natural
limitations.
A second obligation of the legislators is to provide a statutory
declaration of policy regarding the public's interest in the vital transportation facilities which have been turned over to the control of
Public Authorities. In supplying standards and procedures for making
this policy effective, ample latitude could be provided for the continued use of Area-Development Authorities along the lines that were
originally conceived for them. But the practice of grouping highway
and non-highway projects should be drastically curtailed because of
its inconsistency with the principle that special facilities and services
should be paid for by direct beneficiaries thereof. Through its administrative procedures, such legislation should also provide some practical way for the public to compel Area-Development Authorities to
account for their activities and justify the policies they proclaim.
Responsibility for providing these minimum safeguards to the public
interest cannot be ignored by either the states or the Federal Government. Both have areas of responsibility under the Constitution for
protection of this interest. The mere fact that the past role of Congress has been largely limited to giving its consent to compacts between the states should not be accepted as an excuse for Congress to.
continue to rubber-stamp what the states are persuaded to enact.
There is a sufficiently great federal interest in the effect of AreaDevelopment Authorities on interstate and foreign commerce and the
use of navigable waters to require federal action. Based on this precept, many states may also recognize the need for examining their own
laws and past actions for the purpose of similarly protecting the public
in the case of state-created Public Authorities.

